The authors outline steps toward a disinformation theory, a simplified and generalized notion of communication that is intended to be in some way misleading or deceptive. Specifically, their model looks at ways to inject noise.
real world, however, not every communication is a cooperative act. Information can be unwittingly transmitted and eavesdropped upon by someone who wasn't intended to receive it. The model depicted in Figure 1 can be reinterpreted to capture this case: we simply assume the transmission isn't entirely within the message owner's control, and that the receiver has his or her own motives that might not be compatible with our own. What countermeasure does the model offer, given this situation-if we can't completely prevent the transmission? Or, might we distort it enough so that it's hard to recover or, better yet, distort it so that it's entirely misleading?
Such a model is applicable to many other problems: cryptographic communications, 4 signal intelligence, 5 physical camouflage, 6 or even poker games. 7 In each case, information is transmitted. Thus, if you have an adversary that you want to prevent from correctly interpreting the transmission, you will want to determine ways you can manipulate the situation to your advantage.
The Problem
We assume, for this discussion, that although we might be able to manipulate other parts of the abstract communication model, we have no direct control over the receiver. Whatever information makes it through the channel, our adversary is free to interpret as he wishes. This isn't to say that there are no useful suppositions that we can make about how our adversary does his work. For example, we can assume this person has a probabilistic model that maps the received signal to all the possible messages he thinks can be received on the given communication channel. Given a new message, the adversary will measure it according to his model's parameters, trying to find the most likely match by taking into account what he has learned from the message. We assume for the remainder of this article that we and our adversary both have an equal understanding of how to interpret a given message-that is, the message's encoding is well-defined and known to both parties. So, if both parties read the message together, both would agree on what it says. Crucially, we don't assume that either or both parties believe that the message's content is accurate. To be more precise, we know which messages we've interfered with and to what extent we did so, and the adversary may or may not take into account the fact that interference with the communications channel is possible.
Ideally, we want to mislead the adversary into believing that he has received a valid message. To accomplish this, we must credibly estimate what the adversary's model might look like. If we believe the model has an important two-dimensional subspace, it might be represented graphically more or less as shown in Figure 2 .
Each ellipsoid shape delimits the boundaries of a single message, including all possible ways of expressing it. The adversary will map the received signal as a point in the model and interpret it according to the bubble within which the message falls. Messages are close together in the model if they have similar content. Spaces that aren't occupied by messages are allowed by the message encoding but are excluded from the model for domain-specific semantic reasons, such as if they don't make sense or are excluded by accepted facts. In this example, the correct answer, which we don't want the adversary to know, is inside the shape marked with an asterisk. Our goal is to make sure that the adversary can't place the message in the right spot. To do that, we must either deprive him of enough information so that he can't pick out any one message or modify it so that it gets mapped to the wrong point.
To effectively deceive our adversary with a modified transmission, not just any modification will do. Minimally, the received message must still be valid, meaning it must map to one or more members of the set of possible messages. In addition, the received message must be plausible: we must have good reason to believe that if our adversary interprets the falsified message as we intend, he won't disregard it because he also believes it to be false. One part of overcoming this obstacle is to minimize any overt signs of tampering.
No matter how sophisticated a theory we develop, there's no substitute for the hard work of gathering all the knowledge we can about our adversary. After all, we're trying to guess how this person thinks. We might find it useful, therefore, to reason about the model in Figure 2 as if its topology is influenced as much by our domain-specific knowledge of the adversary as the physical constraints of the communication channel itself.
The Saboteur
We developed our disinformation theory within the context of a problem: how to prevent the identification of faces by automatic facial recognition systems. James Alexander's dissertation addresses some of the reasons why it might be desirable to prevent facial recognition systems from performing their main task, as well as how disinformation theory can be applied to this problem. 8 However, for this article's purposes, we focus on demonstrating how to apply the theory to the following question: Even if we fully understand a message's content, do we know how to disrupt it?
Imagine we're in the midst of a war that's geographically distributed over a large area during the pre-radio era. To conduct their basic tasks, far-flung commanders must be able to communicate, but at this stage of technology, most messages are communiqués on paper, carried between the communicating parties by a trusted courier. A set of closely guarded paper embossers authenticates the messages. We're undercover spies whose task is to limit the effectiveness of this communication, preferably without arousing too much suspicion. In short, we want to disrupt as many messages as possible without getting caught. A series of messages that go entirely missing, while completely effective on a per-message basis, is likely to attract unwanted attention rather quickly.
In terms of Shannon's model, we define the communication medium to be the typewritten message as carried by the courier. The transmitter includes the chain of people that convey the message verbally, and the process of encoding the message onto paper is a typewriter. Once the message has left the typewriter, we say that it has been transmitted; at this point, opportunities are available to degrade or modify the content by injecting noise into the communication medium.
In this example, manipulating the courier wouldn't be possible, due to the high risk of detection. Instead, we'll focus on the paper component's vulnerabilities. What tools do we have available in terms of the model? We don't have control over the receiving apparatus, so that leaves us the transmitter and the noise source as candidates. In both cases, we want to take full advantage of our knowledge of the communication medium's limits, overwhelming the channel's theoretical capacity so that information actually gets lost or, better yet, looks like it contains entirely different content than intended.
In terms of modeling our manipulation's plausibility, in addition to minimizing the evidence of tampering, we need to make sure that the message is still believable, yet altered enough so that it gives a tangible advantage to our side. After all, there's no sense risking changing a message if that change is of no value. Relevant knowledge for making such changes seem plausible includes incorporating recent events about battlefields, making the message appear similar to past directives, making the message's information consistent with specific commanders' past behavior, and making the message compatible with all known current conditions.
Destructive Disinformation: Redaction
The simplest, method is to inject noise in a subset of the signal that we select to maximize our advantagenamely, by reducing the message's information content, or, in information-theoretic terms, by increasing its entropy. We don't want to destroy the message outright; instead, we want to damage a subset of the information we believe is the most important. One way of doing this is illustrated in Figure 3 . For obvious reasons, we refer to this method as redaction. A cup of coffee placed strategically on the message before the courier has it (or indeed after the courier has delivered it but before it has been read) can leave a stain that removes or severely degrades key parts of the message. Other tools that could cause similar damage to this paper medium include a strategic splash with muddy water or exposure to heat at key positions. In Figure  2 , the expected effect of this targeted noise injection is shown as the dotted-line circle-the message's information content has been reduced, so it could have several possible matches in the receiver's model. In the radio domain, 9 this method is akin to intermittent jamming. In a facial photograph, it's like inflicting damage on strategically chosen parts of the image.
The problem with redaction is that the loss of information is obvious to the receiver. Our adversary knows what pieces of information are missing from the message, so he doesn't waste a lot of time trying to recover it. Possibly, the adversary can reconstruct partial knowledge about the missing pieces from whatever's left in the message, through context or prior knowledge. The other problem with redaction is that if too many messages are delivered with damage focused on just the critical parts, it will become clear that a saboteur is at work.
Constructive Disinformation: Airbrushing
What if, instead of just destroying the key information in the message, we could replace parts of it with false but convincing information? If we do this well, not only might the presence of tampering be less obvious, we might also be able to convince the receiver that he or she received an entirely different message. We're still trying to overflow the channel capacity, but we're doing so in a way that makes the affected words look like they could be legitimate-in other words, airbrushing. Note that forging messages takes us outside the descriptive capability of conventional information theory. We're attempting to fool the receiver into believing that the communication system is behaving normally, when, in fact, it has failed. We can't characterize this as an increase in entropy, as with redaction. The message's apparent entropy can change in any way-it can even decrease.
Once we decide to use signal airbrushing, we have several strategies we can try. Consider Figure 2 again, focusing on the point marked A. In this variant, we change the message's shape in a relatively small way, such that we get it topologically near the correct message in the receiver's model. We try to preserve its plausibility by leaving most of the message intact, changing it into a nearby message. Figure 4a shows an example; in this case, the replacement coordinates are consistent with historical knowledge about deployments at the stated position, so the changed message might appear to be even more plausible than the real one was. We're aiming our deception at the highest density cluster of messages that still employ a small change. We call this strategy local crowd-blending. The change involved is small, but if chosen well, it could have a big effect on the battle to come. The imperfections caused by the way in which the change was accomplished might be overlooked, at least once, as a genuine error correction on the part of the typist. Our chances of successful deception are particularly good if we can increase the message's plausibility. With a facial image, the equivalent of this technique is to use digital retouching methods to reshape or reposition objectively important features.
If the stakes are higher, we might wish to make a bolder airbrushing attempt. Consider position B in Figure 2 . The message has been modified extensively, so it's much farther away from the original. Figure  4b shows an example. Ideally, if we're going to make such large modifications, we want them to lie in one of the most densely populated regions of the receiver's model. We call this strategy global crowd-blending. Suppose the choice of flare colors or the timing of mortar attacks are in accord with the most frequent past events but are critically wrong for the upcoming battle. A plausible reason could be that the commanders plan to move their forces during bombardment as an element of surprise. If the artillery gunners were aware of the direction from which their own forces were coming, they could adjust their aim accordingly. Of course, in this case, this wasn't the plan, so if this message is plausible, we've led our enemy into a very nasty trap. No matter how plausible the resulting message, larger changes cause more obvious artifacts of tampering, making it easier for the adversary to detect subterfuge. There are ways to improve our chances, however- Figure 5a shows an example. In this attempt to deceive, we've made the same changes as Figure 4b, but we're also using redaction as a form of misdirection. We make liberal use of a lighter to cover up some of the evidence of tampering. Notice we've made sure that the worst damage is confined to parts of the message that are of lesser importance. In this way, receivers might consider themselves lucky that the key parts are still perfectly readable, missing the more subtle tampering that was our real goal. A variant of this technique, that's difficult to actualize with our paper-message channel, is to use two separate levels of interference. One level is meant to be detected: a deliberate but somewhat clumsy attempt at disinformation. This level serves as misdirection for more subtle disinformation, which might go undetected and might be more valuable for our larger strategy.
Instead of making difficult-to-hide modifications, another very valuable airbrushing technique we might try is inserting additional distractor information into the message, as illustrated by Figure 5b . This method might push us into the vicinity of D in the receiver's model ( Figure 2 ). In this case, the target message is a statistical outlier-namely, a message that is very unlikely to be sent. However, we still believe it to be a message that would occur in the adversary's model. Perhaps commanders have heard of retreat being signaled by a flare but haven't yet received such orders themselves. Such a change to a message might strain credulity a bit too far or might be reluctantly accepted. Certainly, more than one or two unusual messages like these would get accepted without confirmation or investigation. We refer to this as the curve-ball strategy, and it could certainly be accomplished by airbrushing as well.
The last possibility shown in Figure 2 , C, is a statistical outlier that isn't likely to be anywhere near a match with anything in the model. An example might be a message modified to include implausible, outlandish disinformation: the intervention of Martian forces, perhaps. We haven't fully worked up this case as a full-fledged example because we don't think it's often a viable strategy (unless you know your adversary to be very gullible). If we're dealing with face recognition, such an implausible outlier might be illustrated by the digital insertion of a third eye. Figure 6 illustrates one final disinformation method. The idea is that we corrupt the message before it ever passes through the typewriter-for instance, by passing false information verbally to one or more of the key players. This is, strictly speaking, not the same class of attack because we've taken control of the transmitter rather than manipulating the noise source. If our efforts succeed, this method still might be very risky, but it has the distinct advantage of producing a transmission free of any evidence of tampering. The message is totally genuine, it just isn't the message that was intended by the sender.
A s shown by Alexander, thinking about a simpler communication scenario, even in its relatively abstract form, is a very helpful tool. It led us to concrete strategies for disguising faces, and has exposed some of the problems we might encounter in realworld applications.
We believe there is much more utility to be plumbed from this model of causing deliberate and precise failures in a communication system. Whether the message appears to have been tampered with or not, the intended message is lost to the receiver. We've therefore moved beyond what information theory was intended to describe. In terms of formalizing the model, what's really needed at this point is a framework for reasoning about what our adversary may or may not know and a method of characterizing how likely our tampering is to go undetected. This moves us more into the realm of behavioral game theory, 10 a variant that tries to capture the psychological element of how humans make strategic decisions. Such an addition would also be useful for thinking through more complicated scenarios where, for instance, our adversary has partial information about our efforts to sabotage a communication channel and might make an effort to communicate steganographically, or perhaps try to goad us into exposing ourselves with messages specifically crafted as bait. We leave these refinements of disinformation theory for future work.
